growth and the development of sound democratic and public institutions. Tertiary education in sub- Saharan Africa promotes economic development and the building of democratic and public institutions, and is therefore a central component in the development of sub-Saharan Africa both economically and politically.

Examples of the relationship between tertiary education, human capital, and economic growth are provided by statistical studies of tertiary education's positive impact on indigenous African entrepreneurial activities. Africa's technological lag and the projected economic growth fueled by increased collegiate technological education also illustrate the economic implications of increased tertiary education.

The rise of the professional Black middle class in post Apartheid South Africa is central to explanation of the role of tertiary education in middle class growth. Democratic institutional outcomes are explained by statistical correlation between middle class income shares and measures of democracy, along with a theoretical framework for the correlation between gross domestic product, the middle class, and democracy. The effect of the middle class on institutional development is evidenced by the need for middle class professionals in different public institutions and the role of the middle class in advocating for sound public institutions.

African universities used to be world-renown centers of learning and research. Today, they are needed to address the grave developmental difficulties facing sub- Saharan Africa. They can provide the human capital necessary for economic growth and the middle class necessary for democratic and public institution building.

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Evaluating Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance: An Exercise in Applied Political Development

by Richard Lappin

Post-conflict democracy assistance is gaining prominence as a means of promoting peace, development and human rights to states devastated by violent conflict. However, the stagnation and even reversal of democratisation in states as far spread as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, and Rwanda has fostered the realization that post-conflict democracy assistance is neither a straightforward process nor a guarantee of positive outcomes. As such, evaluating the impact of democracy assistance has become a key topic in the donor community with a growing recognition that donors need quality research evaluating democracy assistance as a means to assess the effectiveness of programmes and to guide future assistance (Crawford 2003a: 77; Green and Kohl 2007: 152). Moreover, in a time when the very utility of post-conflict democracy assistance is being questioned, an enhanced understanding of its impact can help to "establish a dispassionate intellectual framework within which the more emotional debates – over how much blood and treasure [the international community] should spend in this area – can be fought" (Rose 2000/01: 189).

This article integrates current thinking on the evaluation of post-conflict democracy assistance, and is composed of four main sections. It begins by briefly outlining the exercise of post-conflict democracy assistance, its chief proponents and its basic mandate. In the second section, attention is given to the emerging body of work that has sought to evaluate the impact of democracy assistance with consideration given to the difficulties inherent in measuring its impact. The third section presents, and largely critiques, the methodology that currently dominates

evaluations of post-conflict democracy assistance. The article concludes with a review of the core recommendations that have emerged in the literature and makes a special claim for the inclusion of participatory models of evaluation and the necessity to strengthen the link between evaluation and future strategy.

What is Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance?

Since the end of the Cold War, one of the most striking characteristics to emerge in post-conflict peacebuilding has been the prime position assumed by democratisation; an approach we can term post-conflict democracy assistance. This focus has hinged on an unerring belief that democratic governance, embodied by periodic and genuine elections, offers the most effective mechanism for managing and resolving societal tensions without recourse to violence (Annan 2001; Boutros-Ghali 1992, 1996). Indeed, the benefits of post-conflict democracy assistance have been promulgated for its capacity to advance peace, development and human rights (Lappin 2009), and it has been embraced at the highest stratums of peacebuilding with, for example, Boutros-Ghali declaring that "peace, development and democracy are inextricably linked (1996: 116)."

By the end of the 1990s, the term "democracy assistance" had acquired increasing and extensive usage in academic literature and become a natural part of the rhetoric of foreign policies and the development programmes of Western countries. Nevertheless, despite this growing recognition, the term has rarely been clearly or comprehensively defined. Typically, the term is used with the assumption that the reader will automatically understand the meaning; however, such casual usage can cause confusion, especially as other terms can be used to describe similar phenomena, such as the often used label of "democracy promotion," as well as a host of other variants including "development aid," "political aid," "democracy support," "democracy aid," and "support for democratic development" (Burnell 2000b: 3). As such, it is critically important that researchers are cognizant of the breadth of meaning attached to democracy assistance by different people and practice precision in their own usage and definition of the term. Indeed, if we are unable to achieve accuracy in our terminology, the utility of any evaluation will ultimately be undermined.

Democracy assistance, therefore, can be defined as "the nonprofit transfer of funds, expertise, and material to foster democratic groups, initiatives and institutions that are working for a more democratic society" (De Zeeuw and Kumar 2006: 20) These transfers are usually funded through governmental development agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or the UK's Department for International Development (DfID). The programmes themselves are undertaken by a diverse group of inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and, to a lesser extent, through bilateral agreements. Chief amongst the IGOs are the Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and the Organisation of American States (OAS). The most prominent NGOs include the Carter Center, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and the Centre for Electoral Promotion and Advice (CAPEL). In addition, within a given country, there will also be a range of local counterparts who receive democracy funding including electoral commissions, state institutions, civil society groups, media groups and political parties.

Furthermore, it is essential that the distinction between democracy assistance and democracy promotion is established. Although democracy promotion is often used interchangeably with democracy assistance, the latter should be recognised as only a small and distinct part of a much broader democracy promotion approach. As the table below (fig.1) illustrates, democracy promotion comprises several instruments, both positive and negative, both explicit and implicit, of which democracy assistance is only one distinct part. On the negative side, you have direct military action, which includes armed intervention to promote democracy and can be either explicit (to install a democratic regime, as in Afghanistan) or implicit (to curb an anti-dem-

ocratic regime, as in the first Iraq war). In addition, there is also the explicit tool of negative political conditionality, or 'naming and shaming', in which membership from international organisations may be suspended, economic sanctions applied, and embargoes enforced.

On the positive side, there is the implicit instrument of classical development aid which seeks to foster improved socioeconomic conditions which may consequently lead to democratic developments. Additionally, there is the positive instrument of international interim administrations, as was the case in East Timor, where the democratic transition is directly controlled and managed in its entirety by international actors. There is also the explicit instrument of positive political conditionality, which can include offers of membership in intergovernmental organisations, security guarantees, or economic and trade benefits.

Finally, on the positive side, there is the distinct instrument of democracy assistance. Democracy assistance differs from all other forms of democracy promotion in several ways.

First, it is distinct from military action insofar that it does not 'enforce' democracy, and from international interim administration insofar that it does not 'manage' democracy.

Second, democracy assistance is directed exclusively at fostering democracy, as opposed to classical development aid where democracy is usually only a secondary concern.

Third, democracy assistance is distinct from positive political conditionality insofar that it encompasses direct and active measures, rather than passive tools. Democracy assistance can be further differentiated from political conditionality insofar that it is neither a reward nor a punishment, neither a carrot nor a stick, but rather a "booster" to internal groups already working towards democratisation. Indeed, democracy assistance explicitly recognises that "the primary motive force for democratisation is and must be internal to the country in question" (Burnell 2000b: 9), and that the exclusive intention is "to help domestic actors achieve what they have already decided they want for themselves" (Carothers 2007: 22).

The Impact of Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance

An initial review of the literature illustrates that opinion is divided on the impact of democracy assistance, from positive to negligible to negative. De Zeeuw and Van de Goor (2006: 281) claim the impact of democracy assistance has been "mixed but predominantly positive," Finkel et al. (2007: 436) claim there has been "a moderate but consistent worldwide effect," whilst McMahon (2002) has argued that assistance may be effective in some aspects, some of the time. On the flipside, Knack (2004: 251) has categorically claimed that "no evidence is found that aid promotes democracy."

The fact that such a division in opinion exists nevertheless represents a significant movement from traditional perceptions of external democracy assistance which were typically highly pessimistic. Indeed, in 1984, Huntington (1984: 218) declared that "the ability of the US to affect the development of democracy elsewhere is limited." Furthermore, Dahl (1971: 209-210), explained that:

> Policy makers in a country like the United States who may wish to transform a country from a hegemonic or mixed regime into a polyarchy [i.e. a liberal democracy] face formidable and complex problems, not least of which is our lack of knowledge about the long causal chains running from outside help to internal conditions to changes of regimes.

Dahl was astute in his concerns about cauality; however, the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the seeming triumph of democracy contributed to a widespread ideological consensus that democracy, irrespective of internal preconditions, was the best political system available. This viewpoint found its most famous expression in Fukuyama's The End of History thesis (1992) and its emphasis on democracy as the optimum form of governance was broadly accepted and seamlessly translated into peacebuilding strategies. As Brahm (2004) has written, "once warring sides have reached a ceasefire, democracy is seen as uniquely suited to provide a peaceful means for power and influence." Nevertheless, despite widespread acceptance of the importance of democracy to post-conflict

peacebulding, the impact of external democracy assistance remains contentious.

One area of consensus has been the call for more restraint in assessing the impact of democracy assistance. Carothers (1999: 351), for example, claims that "no dramatic results should be expected from democracy promotion efforts." Moreover, many have directed blame at the democracy assistance organisations themselves, for inflating expectations about their impact. Several authors point to a tendency amongst organisations to claim substantial credit for a democratic transition in which they played only a minor role. For example, Mendelson and Glenn (2002a: 234), have noted how organisations typically "talked only about their successes in order to generate greater resources [which] raised undue expectations about their effectiveness." Indeed, the USAID website, until recently, declared (cited in: Knack 2004):

> There were 58 democratic nations in 1980. By 1995, this number had jumped to 115 nations. USAID provided democracy and governance assistance to 36 of the 57 nations that successfully made the transition to a democratic government during this period.

Although the need to emphasise the positive aspects of their work to secure future funding may be understandable, such statements can severely skew the reality of democracy assistance. As Knack (2004: 252) explains, "obviously the fact that many aid recipients have become more democratic does not by itself imply cause and effect." Indeed, the reality is that measuring democratic outcomes is a highly problematic area and, even if progress is achieved, it is difficult to attribute specific outcomes to particular stimuli (McMahon 2002). As the likes of Green and Kohl (2007) have explained, identifying programme impact in a context of multiple programmes, donors and national and global political and economic conditions presents major difficulties. As Green and Kohl (2007: 157) ask, "how can the impact or effectiveness of a programme be evaluated when the political and social context is a moving target at best?" Moreover, there is also the problem of counterfactuals, making it difficult to justify claims of success, when it is unknown what would

have happened in the absence of a programme. For instance, should democracy assistance organisations be credited for certain developments, or would such developments have occurred regardless of any intervention? As Carothers (2004: 60) reminds us, democracy assistance "is at most a facilitator of locally rooted forces for political change, not the creator of them." As such, the impact of democracy assistance is highly dependent on the context of the given country, both in terms of its socioeconomic conditions and the extent of its government's commitment to genuine reform. With these issues in mind, Crawford and Kearton (2002) declare that the best that can be hoped for are "plausible linkages."

Nevertheless, a difficulty in establishing causation and attribution does not necessarily mean that democracy assistance efforts should be abandoned due to a lack of impact. At a minimum, as De Zeeuw and Van de Goor (2006: 282) observe, "many institutions conducive to democracy, like elections, civil society organisations, print and broadcast media, as well as human rights NGOs, would probably not have existed or survived in many post-conflict countries" without international democracy assistance. Moreover, the most significant impacts of a programme are often difficult to measure and involve the transmission of ideas that impact upon culture, psychology and morals. As Burnell (2000a: 341) states, "project results are often invisible – what's left at the end of the programme is a change of mind, an altered attitude, a new concept and way of doing things."

Moreover, and specifically on the issue of post-conflict transition, there is an argument that critics have been overly harsh in evaluating the impact of democracy assistance. According to Lyons (2002) and Stedman (2002), post-conflict democracy assistance should be judged primarily by its ability to ensure war termination rather than in establishing a fully functioning liberal democracy. As Lyons (2002: 216) states, "in the most difficult cases, ending the war is the only goal that can be accomplished in the short run." It is argued that the bar of what determines a success has been set too high and that, within peace agreements

for post-conflict countries, the priority is always peace and that democracy is included as a support mechanism to the peace process. Lyons (2002: 230-231) argues:

Policymakers charged with addressing the massive challenges that face post-conflict societies cannot afford to make successful democratisation the criterion for all policies and must accept that in many of these hard cases war termination may be the only available short-term option that at least provides for long-term stability and eventual transition to more liberal and democratic governance. To set expectations too high may lead policymakers to miss opportunities to assist in managing conflict.

Support for this viewpoint is given by Reilly (2006) and Kumar (2000: 202), with the latter arguing that "the overall progress in war-torn societies has to be judged not by the prevailing standards of western democracies but with reference to the conditions that existed prior to elections." Therefore, within a post-conflict context, democracy assistance may have to play a subordinate role to the aims of the broader peace process. As Kumar and de Zeeuw (2006: 14) remind us, "the promotion of democracy is not necessarily the only goal, and there are circumstances under which the international community has to make compromises in pursuit of competing objectives, such as avoiding a resumption of war." From this perspective, it is evident that a clear distinction emerges in how the impact of post-conflict democracy assistance can be assessed. Based upon Galtung's (1990) negative and positive concept of peace, post-conflict democracy assistance can be said to comprise of (a) the "negative" tasks of ending violence and establishing the formal procedures of elections, and (b) the "positive" tasks of deepening democracy, aiding inclusiveness and expediting a self-sustaining mechanism to handle conflicts without recourse to violence. Predictably, the balance between these two objectives remains contestable.

Evaluation Methods

Perhaps the biggest problem with measuring the impact of democratisation lies in the very methods used in

evaluating democracy assistance. A review of the literature reveals that six core problems can be identified; namely, a lack of standardised evaluations, an over-reliance on quantitative methods, a lack of precise and comparable data, a lack of flexibility, a neglect of qualitative methods, and a tendency to evaluate too soon after programme completion.

The first significant issue that should be noted is that evaluations of democracy assistance programmes are not a standard and consistent practice and, even when conducted, they are often informal, internally managed, and unpublished (Burnell 2000a: 339). A belief permeates within democracy assistance circles that their work is of unquestionable value and does not warrant evaluation. It is also notable that when evaluations are undertaken, they are rarely shared outside of the sponsoring organisations for fear of revealing weaknesses in a competitive market and losing future work (Crawford 2003a). Moreover, painstaking retrospective analysis can be seen as an unaffordable luxury when there is always another crisis to address and assist (Carothers 1999: 285). Furthermore, as Green and Kohl (2007: 163) contend, the lack of credible evaluations can also be attributed to "a fundamental difference in orientation between the retrospective approach of academics (interest in what was) and the prospective approach of donor agencies (concerned with what could be)." On an operational level, therefore, democracy assistance "remains one of the most opaque areas of Western foreign policies" (Youngs et al. 2006: 8).

Second, donors have illustrated an unabashed preference for quantitative, highly visible and politically attractive outcomes of democracy assistance programmes (Crawford 2003a). For instance, it is much easier to assess the number of voters registered, election turnout, and number of polling staff trained than it is to measure levels of accountability, civic involvement and representation. However, although quantitative data can be helpful in measuring aspects such as the number of NGOs assisted or number of polling staff trained, reducing democracy assistance analysis to a few quantitative indicators can be superficial and danger-

ously misleading. For example, data on the number of judges trained tells us little about whether any improvements occurred in the application of the rule of law. Mendelson and Glenn (2002b: 10) stress that "numbers tell only a limited story," whilst Rose (2000/01: 199) asserts that "simplistic bureaucratic checklists – the political equivalents of Vietnam-era 'body counts' – are inappropriate and ineffective."

Third, the difficulty with quantitative indicators is compounded by the imprecise nature of the available baseline data and the difficulty that this poses for accurate disaggregation (Crawford and Kearton 2002; Green and Kohl 2007: 159; Knack 2004). Different countries use different indicators and classifications to record democracy assistance; moreover, these figures are often merged into wider, standard development projects. Indeed, in one of the few detailed cross-national studies of democracy assistance, Youngs et al. (2006: 21) lamented that "no standard or easily comparable classification of political aid existed across states," and, more worryingly, that several countries had to compile the data upon request. Furthermore, because democracy has become increasingly viewed as central to post-conflict peacebuilding, almost any international assistance effort that addresses perceived or real peacebuilding or development issue can arguably be labelled "democracy assistance." In their study, Youngs et al. (2006: 21), note that "many states included in their democracy and governance categories aid projects that could not be reasonably said to have any meaningful bearing on political reform." Similarly, Burnell (2000a: 339) has posited that some development agencies simply rename their traditional development programmes as "democracy assistance" to demonstrate that they were in tune with fashionable governance themes. As such, seemingly comparable data, such as that from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of OECD-DAC, can be decidedly misleading due to the inability to accurately disaggregate the data.

Fourth, this overarching framework of quantitative analysis has arguably imbued democracy assistance with a crippling lack of flexibility. Indeed, the very design of programmes become limited to what can be measured through quantitative indicators, and it becomes difficult to change direction mid-programme due to a need to fulfil preset quantitative objectives. As Carothers (1999: 270) bemoans, "projects become locked into meeting predefined objectives and indicators, making it more difficult for people working on the ground to modify projects as they learn or as circumstances change." In short, quantitative evaluations are deemed unsuitable as they are oriented to tracking progress to pre-established objectives and are unable to capture the dynamic political context in which democracy assistance activities are embedded (Crawford and Kearton 2002). Post-conflict democracy assistance is a highly context dependent activity and requires the acknowledgement that similar approaches will produce different results in different political environments (Burnell 2008: 425).

Fifth, even when qualitative analysis is included, it typically "ends up being supplementary at best, with little time and energy usually invested in it either by those producing it or those reviewing it" (Carothers 1999: 293). The lack of attention given to this type of analysis also reduces its quality significantly. For example, those interviewed are unlikely to give negative feedback for fear of losing future aid and damaging working relations. As Green and Kohl (2007: 159) explain, "interviews with government agencies or NGOs that receive aid tend to be biased in favour of their programmes." Meanwhile, Carothers (1999) notes how those conducting the interviews tend to be part of the democracy assistance paradigm and, by virtue of this, carry with them the values and assumptions standard of those working in the field. Moreover, they are disinclined to be overly critical for fear of not being selected for such work again.

Sixth, and finally, the value of evaluations is often undermined by the fact that they typically occur immediately once a programme is completed. This is problematic because, as Burnell (2000a: 340) notes, "the true significance of investments in democracy building and their efforts may not become fully apparent until long after the

event." In a similar vein, Finkel et al. (2007) have described the dividend from democracy assistance as possessing a "lagged effect." In essence, there is an inherent contradiction between the long-term process of democratic change and the short-term necessity donors place on agencies to report results quickly (Rakner et al. 2007).

Recommendations

Despite the drawbacks in evaluating the true impact of post-conflict democracy assistance, few have called for democracy assistance to be curtailed, but have rather suggested ways in which the approach could be improved. Broad recommendations aimed at the donor community have centred on the evaluation methods themselves, including suggestions on coordination, timing, relations with target country, consistency, and relations with "high" politics. Although Green and Kohl (2007) are quite right in noting that recommendations are often general and vague, it is of worth to briefly review the most common recommendations cited and what they can tell us of the state of post-conflict democracy assistance evaluations.

Beginning with evaluation methods, it is widely agreed that donors should make better use of qualitative methods as a means of placing assistance efforts within a political context and to acquire a more textured evaluation. Moreover, it is contended that donors must accept, as a fundamental basis, "that many of the most important results of democracy programmes are psychological, moral, subjective, indirect, and time-delayed" (Carothers 1999: 340). As Mendelson and Glenn (2002b: 10) note, donors must acknowledge that they are "engaged in a long term incremental process of changing behaviour and perceptions that is simply not linear or quantifiable." Independent and public analysis should also be encouraged because self-evaluation is not reliable (McMahon 2002) and in-house "standards of democratic performance are liable to be too low" (Whitehead 2004: 153). Indeed, recent institutional evaluations criticised the UK based Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) of not conducting enough self-evaluations (River Path Associates 2005) and the

Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) of treating assessment as an end in itself (European Centre for Development Policy Management 2005). It is of note that positive steps have been taken in this direction through the promotion of Conflict Impact Assessment (CIAS) and the Aid for Peace frameworks by Paffenholz and Reychler (2007). However, a donor reluctance to move away from numbers remains evident (Mendelson and Glenn 2002a: 236).

Perhaps the most commonly cited recommendation is for enhanced coordination and harmonisation amongst donors (Ellis et al. 2006; Rakner et al. 2007; Wood 2001). As Green and Kohl (2007: 157) explain, "whereas in other field of development assistance, cooperation among donors is the norm, donor coordination and cooperation is not a standard practice as far as democracy assistance is concerned." Overcoming donor fragmentation would increase the cost-effectiveness of aid by avoiding duplication of efforts and by allowing for a deeper understanding of the local dynamics (McMahon 2002).

Many authorities have also called for a longer engagement with the target country, asserting that "it can take years, even decades, to nurse political and social institutions that can promote and strengthen democracy" (Kumar 2000: 205). McMahon (2002) has stressed that for assistance to be credible it must be sustained and that "one-shot" assistance is usually not well-absorbed. Additionally, Ellis (2006) has noted that assistance should not only last longer, but should arrive earlier in the transition process. Even though the call for a more sustained engagement is worthwhile, De Zeeuw (2007: 97) notes that such recommendations are "tantamount to wishful thinking."

There has also been an allied call for better targeting of democracy aid, with the claim that "less is indeed more." For example, Steele and Scott (2005: 20-21) have observed how general aid is largely ineffective, but "much smaller amounts of assistance directed at more specific democracy support projects" are infinitely more effective.

Several authors have further noted how the sense of ownership of democratisation is

often weak in many post-conflict countries (Kumar 2004), with critics arguing that processes can often become donor led and donor dependent (Newman 2004: 197). As such, it has been stressed that links between donors and the recipient country should be improved, particularly in terms of explaining their work better and increasing genuine indigenous involvement (Wood 2001: 50). Rakner et al. (2007) emphasise that a democratisation effort will only be successful if it is internally driven, a factor especially pertinent as high donor investment is unlikely to be sustained for long periods of time. Rose (2000/01) Crawford and Kearton (2002) and Burnell (2008) have all recommended participatory approaches to evaluation, as a means to highlight the perspectives of domestic actors on external efforts. The benefit of participatory evaluation is not simply a means to better justify programmes or even to improve future strategies, but, as Burnell (2008: 427) explains, "to exercise, display and share the democratic ethos." Indeed, by fostering joint ownership of both the process and evaluation of democracy assistance, the exercise of evaluation becomes an exercise in democratisation in itself (Crawford 2003b: 17).

In addition, several calls have been made for more consistency in the focus of democracy assistance. Smith (2007: 129), for example, notes that "the incoherent and inconsistent pursuit of aims such as democracy promotion" does not contribute positively to the image of external assistance. A lack of consistency and integrity in application can not only adversely affect perceptions of democracy assistance, but it can also have practical disadvantages in terms of lessons not being learned and "reinventing the wheel" on every mission. Burnell (2000a: 343) notes that assistance should retain a flexibility to adapt to local context, but that "this is not an argument for amateurism, for a wasteful duplication of effort or the kind of collective amnesia that would allow remediable weaknesses in emerging democracies to 'fall through the cracks'."

Finally, the argument has been made for a stronger relationship between democracy assistance and "high" politics. It has been argued that a significant degree of the problems faced in transitional countries are not because of lack of technical know-how, but a politicisation of key institutions such as the media and electoral commissions. Burnell (2007) and Santiso (2002) both note a need to deliberately engage with the power relations in a target country, and De Zeeuw (2007) questions "the extent to which democracy can be enhanced through the 'positive' route of aid projects without attendant critical diplomatic purchase." However, as we have seen in discussions on the definition of democracy assistance, such moves could drift into the broader domain of democracy promotion and, although perhaps valid recommendations, should be treated with high caution when linked to the more neutral tools of democracy assistance.

Conclusions

The increased attention paid to issues of post-conflict democracy evaluation is both welcomed and necessary. As Burnell (2000a: 353) explains, "the political costs of failed or misguided interventions can be high, even when the expenditure has been small. Not just a democracy provider's reputation but the relations between states can be placed in jeopardy." It has also become clear that democracy assistance does not submit to a simple positive/negative analysis and that there is a need for more textured qualitative analysis to acquire an improved understanding of the possibilities and limitations of assistance. An acknowledgement that external assistance is only one factor amongst a complicated mixture of influences is also perceptible, prompting Cousens (2001: 15) to claim that organisations and donors alike need 'to be ruthlessly modest about its ambitions.' Perhaps most critically though, a recognition is emerging that evaluations are not exercises confined exclusively to measuring impact. Rose (2000/01: 189) once described democracy assistance as "an exercise in applied political development," and these sentiments should be extended to the evaluation process too. Indeed, the promise of enhanced evaluations of post-conflict democracy assistance are not restricted to the appraisal of a given programme; rather, the true potential rests in the

capacity to improve strategy in advance, to extend democratic values to the very exercise of evaluation itself, and to continuously prompt the international community to consider why post-conflict democracy assistance is such a valued approach.

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Reflections on Sikh Theology, Philosophy, and Jurisprudence

by Satvinder Singh Juss

What impact can Sikhism have on matters that concern the law? How can it help shape issues of issues justice, forgiveness, community, discipline, love, human rights, secularism and the State? The answers, crucial to the relevance of law in society, remain as elusive as ever. The Sikh religion's fundamental premise is that all people are equal and that life is altogether simpler than orthodox religion would have one believe. This article provides an overview of the central tenets of Sikh belief. Can modern law benefit from such belief-based practices? Can it integrate into policy? The purpose of this article is to suggest that it can.

The Basis of Sikh Jurisprudence

Sikh religious tradition[1] begins with Guru Nanak (1469-1539), the founder of Sikhism. He used the medium of devotional religious songs to spread his message of personal love for God[2] and the universal

1 For an excellent account, see Hew McLeod, The Evolution of the Sikh Community, (OUP, 1976)

2 Satvinder S. Juss, Ency-